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Abstract Solvency II will become the new regulatory framework for insurance
companies in Europe. It sets the capital requirements in function of the insurer’s risk
exposure at a one-year time horizon. The objective of the paper is to quantify the
cost of the volatility in the required capital induced by the Solvency II liability
valuation methodology. First, we show that Solvency II will induce large variation
in the required capital for illiquid long-term products with guarantees. The volatility
of the required capital is larger for policies with a larger maturity. We then intro-
duce a different liability valuation technique specifically for illiquid liabilities. The
volatility of the required capital in this model is lower since it only depends on the
default component of the credit spread of the backing assets. We prove that this
model is market consistent. We conclude by estimating the cost of the option, which
an insurer could buy to eliminate the extra induced capital volatility. Such option
will generate the cash flow necessary to supply the extra required capital resulting
from a change in illiquidity spread.
Keywords Solvency II  Long-term insurance products  Illiquidity  Volatility 
Credit spread process  Matching adjustment
1 Introduction
The key difficulty in establishing a market consistent framework for the insurance
business is the lack of a market where insurance liabilities are traded. While the
market value of assets can readily be determined using a mark-to-market approach,
for liabilities one has to rely on the mark-to-model approach. The difficulty thus lies
in valuing liabilities that are not traded, with a market consistent model constructed
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in such a way that the (implicit) model assumptions do not contradict the
characteristics of the insurance liability.
1.1 Illiquid long-term insurance products with guarantees
Long-term insurance products have long maturities which can reach 40 years or
more for certain pension and annuity products. Historically, asset liability
management and capital management of these products has centered around its
long maturity. Insurers often invest the premiums in fixed income instruments in
such a way that the fixed income cash flows replicate the liability cash flow runoff.
This allows the insurer to honor the payout that it guaranteed to its policyholder.
The risk carried by the insurer with this investing strategy is the risk of default of the
fixed income instrument.
The Solvency II Directive [6], which will take effect on 1/1/2016, creates a risk-
based regulatory framework for capital requirements and risk management of
insurance undertakings and is built around the undertaking’s risk exposure at the
1 year time horizon. The Solvency II liability valuation model consists of
discounting the liability cash flows at the risk-free rate to obtain its value. This
valuation method implies that the liabilities are valued as risk-free (non-defaultable)
bonds.
For long-term insurance products this liability valuation technique combined
with the one-year time horizon led to several issues. Indeed, credit spread variations
in the financial markets will affect the asset side of the balance sheet, but not the
liability side. This results in a high volatility of the net asset value of the balance
sheet. Moreover, this approach overestimates the volatility and the risk since it
captures the entire credit spread risk, which includes more than the risk of default.
Spread risk includes liquidity risk in addition to default risk [8]. Indeed, if the asset
and liability cash flows are matched and the liability cash flow is sufficiently stable,
then the insurance undertaking is not exposed to the illiquidity of the market since
the insurer can wait for maturity of the instrument.
Two conditions have to be fulfilled for an insurer not to be exposed to liquidity
risk. First, asset and liability cash flows have to be matched. Indeed, imagine that
the cash flows are not matched as the insurance liability has to be paid out before the
fixed income asset matures. In such case the asset will have to be sold before
maturity to pay out the liability. Selling the asset will happen at the market price.
The insurer is hence exposed to the risk that the market is illiquid at that time,
resulting in a lower market value. If, on the other hand, the asset cash flow matches
the liability cash flow then the insurer does not need to sell in the secondary market,
but can wait for the instrument to mature.
The second condition which needs to be fulfilled for the insurer not to be exposed
to liquidity risk, is that the cash flow of the insurance liability has to be sufficiently
stable. Even when the insurance liability is cash flow matched, if the policyholder
has the right to redeem the policy early, the insurer will have to sell the backing
asset at market price which exposes the insurer again to the full credit spread risk. In
practice, many long-term insurance product have stable cash flow runoffs. For
example, a pension product where the policyholder receives a lump sum upon
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reaching a set retirement age. The policyholder cannot choose to reach that
retirement age early. Moreover, there are legal and/or fiscal hurdles in many
European countries to an early redemption of a pension product. If the policyholder
is allowed to transfer the product from one insurer to another, a market value
adjuster clause in the contract can specify that the client carries the market risk
under such a transfer before maturity of the product. Annuities is another example
of a product class which often has a stable runoff. Long-term insurance products
with a stable cash flow are often referred to as illiquid liabilities.1
In this paper we will consider a valuation technique that takes into account the
illiquidity of the liability in a market consistent way. To that end, we will work with a
mathematical toy example that stylizes the two key properties discussed above. We
will assume a perfect cash flow matching and we will assume the product to have an
entirely stable cash flow. The entirely stable cash flow implies that the policyholder
has no option to redeem or trade the policy, as such the policy cannot be converted
into cash before maturity. This toy example has first been introduces in [14] to study
similar questions. Our analysis differs from [14] since we allow the illiquidity spread
to be time-dependent, which will provide us with different conclusions.
1.2 The matching adjustment and volatility adjustment
To address the issues of volatility discussed in the previous section and the
procyclicality this would entail, the Solvency II Draft Implementing Measures[5]
from 31 October 2011 included a mechanism, the Matching Premium, designed to
alleviate these issues. This mechanism modifies the standard Solvency II valuation
method for liabilities which satisfy a set of precise conditions. The valuation method
now allows for the discounting of the liability cash flow at the risk-free rate plus an
excess spread. This excess spread is linked with the illiquidity component of the
credit spread of the backing assets.
The conditions for an insurance product to qualify for application of the
Matching Premium were in broad lines based on the two key conditions identified in
the previous section. These qualification conditions are binary, either a product does
qualify for the use of the Matching Premium or it does not. In practice, a very
limited number of long-term products satisfies all required conditions. An extensive
discussion between the industry and the European authorities ensued and alternative
proposals were launched. The trilogue parties comprised of the European
Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union
agreed in July 2012 to an assessment of the different proposed solutions in the form
of the Long-Term Guarantee Assessment (LTGA).2
In its final report on the LTGA [4], EIOPA expressed a preference for
maintaining the more restrictive conditions on the Matching Adjustment.3 Shortly
1 The term illiquid refers here to the stability of the liability cash flow runoff and should not be confused
with the illiquidity spread which is a component of the credit spread of fixed income assets.
2 The Long-Term Guarantee Assessment did contain some other elements related to long-term insurance
product that we do not discuss here.
3 Since some technical specifications had been modified, the name of the Matching Premium was
changed to the Matching Adjustment.
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thereafter a new mechanism, the volatility adjuster, was proposed for products
which cannot satisfy the Matching Adjustment conditions. While this new
mechanism originally might have been inspired by the Matching Adjustment, it is
merely an adjustment of the risk-free curve. There is no link with the type of
liability nor with the backing asset. Whether a liability has a stable cash flow runoff
or not, the mechanism applies in equal amount. The Volatility Adjuster can thus be
seen as part of the definition of the risk-free curve under Solvency II.
1.3 A valuation model for illiquid long-term insurance products
To come to a better understanding of the valuation of illiquid insurance liabilities
and its practical implementation, there are three topics that have to be analyzed.
First, a market consistent valuation technique has to be derived which takes the
long-term nature of the liability combined with its illiquidity into account. In [14]
the Matching Adjustment valuation model is analyzed and it is proven that this
model is not market consistent (see section 2.4 of [14]). The main aim of this paper
is to propose a valuation model which is market consistent, while taking into
account the specific features of illiquid long-term insurance products with
guarantees.
Second, a key ingredient to be able to account for illiquidity, is measuring the
illiquidity component in credit spreads. This paper does not address how to
differentiate the real world default probability and the illiquidity spread. This is an
interesting and complex issue dealt with in a rapidly growing body of literature (see
[2, 10] or [8] for corporate debt and [7] for government bonds).
Third, as discussed earlier, two key conditions have to be satisfied for the insurer
to be solely exposed to default risk. To apply the valuation technique in practice,
one has to translate these key conditions into practical conditions that a product has
to satisfy. The conditions for application of the Matching Adjustment in the Draft
Implementing Measures [5] is one such translation. One could envision, instead of
the binary conditions of the Draft Implementing Measures, where you either qualify
to apply the Matching Adjustment or do not qualify, conditions which take the
degree of illiquidity into account in a more gradual way.
As this paper aims to contribute to the first topic by working out a different
valuation technique, we will argue that an illiquid policy is different from a risk-free
non-defaultable bond and that this difference plays an essential role in the valuation.
The difference between a risk-free bond and a long-term insurance product can be
illustrated from the insurer’s perspective, as well as from the policyholder’s point of
view.
First, imagine a potential policyholder planning to invest savings in either a
highly rated bond or a pension product with equal payout and maturity. The pension
product locks in the money until retirement without the possibility of early
redemption, while the bond can be sold before maturity. If both options would have
the same value, there would be no reason to buy the pension product. Indeed, the
bond has the advantage that it can traded before maturity. The value of the pension
product should thus deviate from the value of the bond.
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Now consider an insurer planning to buy another insurance company. The insurer
is interested in two insurance companies as takeover targets. Both of these
companies have underwritten similar policies for a very similar population of
policyholders. There is one major difference. Policyholders of the first undertaking
are allowed to redeem their policy, while the policyholders of the second
undertaking cannot redeem. In this case, we argue that the price for takeover
(irrespective of possible capital requirements) of the first undertaking should be
lower, accounting for the risk premium that an unexpected amount of policyholders
might execute the redemption option in the policy. Indeed, a policy with redemption
option is more similar to a bond, where liquidity is available to the investor via the
secondary market. The absence of this embedded option, the illiquidity, lowers the
value of the policy.
A insurance liability model should be able to account for the price difference
illustrated in the previous paragraphs. Models based on the efficient market
hypothesis presume that all priced instruments are readily tradable in a deep and
liquid market. However, by design, our illiquid insurance contract is non-tradable.
As such, we argue that a model that applies the efficient market hypothesis alone is
not able to price such instrument.
1.4 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the balance sheet model
developed by MV Wu¨thrich [14]. We extend the model to include a time-variable
spread and insurance products with a longer maturity.
In Sect. 3, we show that the market consistent solvency analysis as presented in
Sect. 2.3 of [14] leads to volatility in the consumption stream. Insurers will be
exposed to the daily variation of the spread risk of the bond market. This effect is
more pronounced for longer-term insurance products.
In Sect. 4, we derive a model which uses a different definition for the market
value of an insurance liability. We show that this model still satisfies the no
arbitrage condition. However, crucially, the consumption stream of this model is
less volatile.
Section 5 focuses on the downside risk of having a negative consumption stream.
We analyze the option that an insurance company could buy to insure themselves
against the downside risk. We conclude by estimating the behavior of the option
price for insurance products with a longer maturities.
2 Market-consistent solvency analysis
In this section we set up the theoretical framework which we will use throughout the
paper. We start from the example presented in [14]. We proceed to extend this
model to include a time-dependent illiquidity spread. This extension will allow us to
investigate the impact of a variable credit spread. We then extend the model to a
multi-period model to study the impact of longer-term maturities.
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We note that throughout this paper, we use the deflators formalism with (real
world) measure E½. . .. One could translate the assumptions and calculations to the
risk neutral measure ~E½. . ., since the deflator formalism is fully equivalent to the
risk neutral formalism. However, for the derivations of the volatility and probability
of negative consumption in the sections below, one has to use the real world
measure since we are interested in real world volatilities and probabilities.
2.1 Insurance balance sheet model
In this section we review in detail the example presented in [14].
2.1.1 State price deflator and pricing of zero-coupon bonds
The example is constructed in a filtered probability space ðX;F ;P;FÞ with finite
time horizon n 2 and discrete time filtration F ¼ ðFÞt¼0;...;n with F 0 ¼ f;; Xg We
construct the state price deflator u ¼ ðutÞt¼0;...;n using two strictly positive and F-
adapted stochastic processes w ¼ ðwtÞt¼0;...;n and v ¼ ðvtÞt¼0;...;n. We take w0 ¼ 1





The decoupling property of the state price deflator u into a ‘‘global market state
price deflator’’, w, and ‘‘idiosyncratic distortions’’, v, will be crucial.
The price of a default-free zero-coupon bond is given by





E½wmjF t : ð2Þ
The proof of the second equation is given in [14] and makes use of the indepen-
dence of vt from rfF t1; wg and the condition E½vt ¼ 1.
To compute the price of defaultable zero-coupon bonds we introduce a default
process C ¼ ðCtÞt¼0;...;n, where C is a non-increasing process with C0 ¼ 1 and Ct ¼
0 if the bond has defaulted in ½0; t otherwise Ct ¼ 1. We assume the process C to be
F-adapted and independent of w. In addition, we assume for all t [ 0
E½CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞCt1 ð3Þ
E½vt CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞ ð1  sÞCt1 ð4Þ
for fixed p 2 ð0; 1Þ parameterizing the real world probability of default and s 2
½0; 1Þ which represents the illiquidity spread. We can now compute the price of a
defaultable zero-coupon bond:
Bðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E½umCmjF t ¼ Pðt; mÞ ð1  pÞmt ð1  sÞmt Ct : ð5Þ
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The proof of the second equation is given in [14]. The price of a defaultable zero-
coupon bond conditional on the fact that the bond survived at least up to time k
(with k tm) is given by
BðkÞðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E½umCðkÞm jF t ¼ Pðt; mÞ ð1  pÞmt ð1  sÞmt CðkÞt : ð6Þ
with CðkÞt the default process conditional on the fact the Ck ¼ 1.
2.1.2 Solvency analysis of a simple insurance liability
Following [14], we now study the balance sheet of an insurance company. We
consider an insurance liability given by a default-free cash flow of size M ¼ 1 at
time m ¼ 2. Strictly speaking this is not an insurance contract since we consider a
completely predictable liability cash flow. As discussed in Sect. 1.1 of the
introduction, many long-term insurance products have stable cash flows and are, as
such, close to this stylized mathematical toy example. The time series of the market-
consistent value of the liability of the balance sheet is given by
L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ; L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ; L2 ¼ Pð2; 2Þ ¼ 1 and Lt 3 ¼ 0 : ð7Þ
We now briefly review the analysis of [14].
Time t = 0 The value of the insurance contract is L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ. The policyholder
is thus charged a (single pure risk) premium of p ¼ L0. We assume the insurer
chooses to invest the premium income in a defaultable zero-coupon bond of the
same maturity as the liability:
A0 ¼ p ¼ ð1  pÞ2 ð1  sÞ2 Bð0; 2Þ ð8Þ
For this operation, the insurer does not need extra available capital, nor does it
generate available capital. The capital consumption is
C0 ¼ A0  p ¼ 0 : ð9Þ
Time t = 1 The asset and liability values have evolved to:
A0 ! A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 C1 Pð1; 2Þ ð10Þ
L0 ! L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ ð11Þ
To reinstate A1 ¼ L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ, the insurer will either need to inject capital in case
the asset defaulted or the asset will have created capital which becomes available.
As in [14], we assume that the injection of new capital is done through new (de-
faultable) bonds that have not defaulted yet. The capital consumption is:
C1 ¼ A1  A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ : ð12Þ
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Time t = 2 Assets and liabilities are now:
A1 ! A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 Cð1Þ2 Pð2; 2Þ ð13Þ
L1 ! L2 ¼ 1 ð14Þ
To pay out the policyholder A2 ¼ L2 ¼ 1, the insurer faces the following capital
consumption:
C2 ¼ A2  A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 Cð1Þ2  1
h i
ð15Þ
The consumption stream is thus given by
C0 ¼ 0 ð16Þ
C1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ ð17Þ
C2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 ð1  sÞ1 Cð1Þ2  1
h i
ð18Þ




E½uu Cu ¼ 0 ð19Þ
which implies that there exists no arbitrage strategy for this insurance product since
the pure risk premium was correctly chosen.
2.2 Extension of the model with a time-dependent spread
2.2.1 Deflator and zero-coupon bonds with time-dependent spread
We will extend the example introduced in Sect. (2.1.2) with a time-dependent
correlation between v and C. We therefore replace the time-invariant assumptions
(3)–(4) with the conditions that for all t [ 0,
E½CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞCt1 ð20Þ
E½vt CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞ ð1  ~st1ÞCt1 ð21Þ
E½ð1  ~stÞkvt CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞ ð1  ~st1Þkþ1 Ct1;8k : 0 k n  t ð22Þ
where the illiquidity spread ~s ¼ ð~stÞt¼0;...;n with ~st 2 ½0; 1Þ; 8t is now a F-adapted
stochastic process independent of w. Note that since ~st is F t-measurable, but not
F t1-measurable, we cannot take the term ð1  ~stÞk outside the expectation E½. . . in
(22). Given these assumptions, defaultable bonds have a price at time t, with tm,
given by
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Bðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut






vu E½vm CmjFm1; w
F t
" #





vu E½ð1  ~sm1Þ vm1 Cm1jFm2; w
F t
" #





vu vm2 ð1  ~sm2Þ2 Cm2
F t
" #
¼ . . . ¼ ð1  pÞmt ð1  ~stÞmt Ct Pðt; mÞ : ð23Þ
We see that with the new assumptions (20)–(22), our asset universe now includes a
set of bonds with different maturities 0m n, with a constant default probability
per time step p, and with a variable illiquidity spread ~st, which under our
assumptions is independent from the maturity m of the bond. For example, taking
n ¼ 2, we have a set of 3 bonds with different maturities with the following market
values Bðt; mÞ (where q ¼ 1  p):
t ¼ 0 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 2
m ¼ 0 1
m ¼ 1 q ð1  ~s0ÞPð0; 1Þ C1 Pð1; 1Þ
m ¼ 2 q2 ð1  ~s0Þ2 Pð0; 2Þ q ð1  ~s1ÞC1 Pð1; 2Þ C2 Pð2; 2Þ
If one would add another set of defaultable bonds to our asset universe, we would
introduce another default process, C0, that characterizes these bonds. Using this new
default process, one can compute the associated default probability p0 and illiquidity
spread ~s0t:
E½C0tjF t1; w ¼ ð1  p0ÞC0t1 ð24Þ
E½vt C0tjF t1; w ¼ ð1  p0Þ ð1  ~s0t1ÞC0t1 ð25Þ
Note that it is, for example, possible to have two sets of bonds with the same default
probability p0 ¼ p, but another spread process ~s0t 6¼ ~st.
For the rest of the paper, we will redefine the spread process as
1  ~st ¼ est 2 ð0; 1 ; ð26Þ
with st 2 ½0;1Þ. The assumptions (20)–(22) are thus rewritten as
E½CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞCt1 ð27Þ
E½ek stvt CtjF t1; w ¼ ð1  pÞ eðkþ1Þ st1 Ct1; 8k : 0 k n  t ð28Þ
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and we have
Bðt; mÞ ¼ ð1  pÞmt eðmtÞ st Ct Pðt; mÞ : ð29Þ
Note that this paper does not address the question on how to measure the real world
default probability p and the illiquidity spread st.
2.2.2 Solvency analysis with varying spread
We now revisit the insurance balance sheet from Sect.2.1.2 and work out the
consumption stream.
Time t = 0 The insurance company invests the premium p ¼ L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ in a
defaultable zero-coupon bond with the same maturity.
A0 ¼ p ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 Bð0; 2Þ ð30Þ
The consumption is
C0 ¼ A0  p ¼ 0 : ð31Þ
Time t = 1 We now have:
A0 ! A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 Bð1; 2Þ ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1 Pð1; 2Þ ð32Þ
L0 ! L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ ð33Þ
and
C1 ¼ A1  A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ ð34Þ
such that A1 ¼ L1. Notice that if the bond has defaulted (C1 ¼ 0) then C1\0. This
is similar to the constant spread model. However, unlike the constant spread model,
we can have C1\0 without default (C1 ¼ 1):
es1\ð1  pÞ e2s0 : ð35Þ
Time t = 2 We get
A1 ! A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 es1 Bð1Þð2; 2Þ ¼ ð1  pÞ1 es1 Cð1Þ2 Pð2; 2Þ ð36Þ
L1 ! L2 ¼ 1 ð37Þ
with consumption
C2 ¼ A2  A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 es1 Cð1Þ2  1
h i
: ð38Þ
The total consumption stream is:
C0 ¼ 0 ð39Þ
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C1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ ð40Þ
C2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 es1 Cð1Þ2  1
h i
ð41Þ
and the no arbitrage condition, Q0½C ¼ 0, is still satisfied.
2.3 Extension of the model to long-term insurance products
One can easily extend the derivation of Sect. 2.2.2 to a larger maturity m. The
consumption stream is given by
C0 ¼ 0 ð42Þ
Ct ¼ ð1  pÞ1 eðmtÞ ðstst1Þ est1 Cðt1Þt  1
h i
Pðt; mÞ ð43Þ
with 1 tm. For t [ 0, we can compute
E½ut Ct
¼ E wtv0. . .vt1vtð1  pÞ1eðmtÞst eðmtþ1Þst1Cðt1Þt Pðt; mÞ  utPðt; mÞ
h i











and thus the no arbitrage condition, Q0½C ¼ 0, holds.
3 Analysis of the consumption stream volatility
As we noticed in Sect. 2.2.2, there are two possible reasons for a negative
consumption Ct. If the assets defaults, then Ct\0. If the asset does not default, then
having
eðmtÞ ðstst1Þ\ð1  pÞest1 ð45Þ
also leads to a negative consumption. Given that m  t can easily be of the order of
30 (or higher) for long-term insurance products, this condition can be satisfied for
relatively smaller spread increases.
Let us estimate the volatility of the consumption C1 at time 1. We remind
ourselves that we compute the volatility using the real world measure E½. . ., since
we are interested in real world volatilities. We compute






Pð1; mÞ EPð1; mÞ




Pð1; mÞ ; ð46Þ
Long-term insurance products and volatility 325
123






P2ð1; mÞþ EP2ð1; mÞ
 2 es0 Eeðm1Þ ðs1s0ÞEP2ð1; mÞ









P2ð1; mÞ : ð47Þ
We find that



























The first term is due to the volatility in the spread, the second term due to the
volatility in the default process and the third term is linked with the volatility of the
term structure which determines the price of non-defaultable zero-coupon bonds.
The last term, A, is the cross term with all the covariance terms:



































Pð1; mÞ : ð49Þ
If we consider a bond with maturity m and approximate the associated spread
process ðs1  s0Þ with a normal distribution N

l ¼ 0; rðmÞ where we parametrize
rðmÞ with an empirical formula which exhibits a decaying volatility with maturity
(m  1),
r2ðmÞ ¼ r20 þ r21
1

























¼ e12ðm1Þ2 r20þ12r21 : ð52Þ
We can see in formula (48) that the illiquidity spread term dominates the volatility
terms coming from the default process and from the term structure for large m. The
first term of (49) has the dominant m-dependence among the cross terms. Its m-
dependence is equal to that of the illiquidity spread term. We conclude that the
volatility of the consumption stream, Var½C1, increases exponentially with the
maturity of the insurance product. Moreover, this rapid increase is entirely due to
time-dependent illiquidity spread. Indeed, if we assume a constant illiquidity spread
s, then we see that the first term in (48) and all cross terms disappear. The m-
dependence of the volatility of the consumption stream then becomes implicit
through the term structure Pð1; mÞ.
4 Impact of the definition of the market value of non-tradable liabilities
on the capital flow volatility
4.1 Reduced time grid
Let us now reconsider the example from Sect. 2.2.2. We will alter the time grid by
leaving out the odd times. The consumption stream is now given by
eC 00 ¼ 0 ð53Þ
eC 02 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2  1
h i
ð54Þ
In this example there still is no over-consumption of capital which would violate




E½u2u eC 02u ¼ 0 : ð55Þ
It is crucial to note that the policyholder does not have any arbitrage opportunity
either, given the specific characteristics of the policy which is non-redeemable and
non-tradable. The consumption stream only depends on the default in this case, not
on spread movements. Indeed, eC 02\0 implies that C2 ¼ 0. The volatility of the
consumption stream is smaller compared to the volatility of the example from
Sect. 2.2.2.
We could extend this example again to larger maturities m. This would lead us to
the same conclusion. Indeed, since we only have consumption streams on even
times, we will find that the volatility of this consumption stream is lower than a
situation with a consumption stream every time step as in Sect. 2.3. The spread term
in the volatility [see equation (48)] will be less dominant over the volatility term
from the default process. One could think of this reduced time grid example as an
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example of Solvency II, but with a 2 year time horizon instead of a one-year
horizon.
There is another equivalent point of view to interpret this reduced time grid
example. Recall that given the absence of insurance contract trading, liabilities have
to be valued using a mark-to-model approach respecting market consistency.
Leaving out the odd time step in the above example is equivalent to imposing
eC 01 ¼ 0, or defining the market value of the liability in the model at time 1 to be
equal to L1 ¼ A1 ¼ A1.
We also note that the policyholder in the reduced time grid example receives
exactly the same payout as in the example of Sect. 2.2.2. The difference between
both examples is the definition of the market value of the liability.
4.2 Reduced consumption stream
The reduced time grid example is merely a theoretical example, since it contains a
serious flaw from a practical point of view. If the bond defaults at time 1 (C1 ¼ 0
and thus A1 ¼ A1 ¼ 0), no capital is injected at t ¼ 1. The policyholder relies
entirely on the consumption stream at t ¼ 2 to back the liability. In this section, we
will develop a market consistent model with a reduced consumption stream at t ¼ 1
which is always eC1 ¼ 0 unless a default occurs.
Time t = 0 Just as in the previous examples, the insurance company invests the
premium p ¼ L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ in a defaultable zero-coupon bond with the same
maturity.
A0 ¼ p ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 Bð0; 2Þ ð56Þ
The consumption is
eC0 ¼ A0  p ¼ 0 : ð57Þ
Time t = 1 The value of the bond has evolved to:
A0 ! A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 Bð1; 2Þ ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1 Pð1; 2Þ : ð58Þ
We now impose a consumption stream that only injects cash if a default occurred:
eC1 ¼ A1  A1 ¼ ð1  C1ÞPð1; 2Þ : ð59Þ
We thus, implicitly, defined the market value of the liability as
L1 ¼ A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1  C1 þ 1
h i
Bð1Þð1; 2Þ ð1  pÞ1 es1 : ð60Þ
On the other hand, when a default happens we inject capital through the con-
sumption stream [see Eq. (59)], and restore L1 ¼ A1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ.
Time t = 2 We get
A1 ! A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2 þ ð1  pÞ1 es1 ð1  C1ÞCð1Þ2 ð61Þ
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where we used that C1C
ð1Þ
2 ¼ C2. The consumption is thus:
eC2 ¼ A2  A2 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2 þ ð1  pÞ1 es1 ð1  C1ÞCð1Þ2  1 ; ð62Þ
with A2 ¼ L2 ¼ 1.
The total consumption stream is:
eC0 ¼ 0 ð63Þ
eC1 ¼ ð1  C1ÞPð1; 2Þ ð64Þ
eC2 ¼ ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2 þ ð1  pÞ1 es1 ð1  C1ÞCð1Þ2  1 ð65Þ
We now confirm that this model is market consistent by checking that the no
arbitrage condition is still satisfied:
Q0½eC ¼ E½u1 ðC1  1ÞPð1; 2Þ þ E½u2 ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2
þ E½u2 ð1  pÞ1 es1 ð1  C1ÞCð1Þ2   E½u2
¼ E½w2v0v1 ðC1  1Þ þ E½u2 þ E½w2v0v1 ð1  C1Þ  E½u2
¼ 0 : ð66Þ
4.3 Analysis of the reduced consumption stream model
The liability value at time 1 in the reduced consumption stream model is given by
equation (60). If the backing bond defaulted (C1 ¼ 0), then we have L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ. If
the bond did not default, then the market value is given by
L1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 Pð1; 2Þ. In the latter case, the liability value is asset-
dependent. Indeed, since the liability is non-tradable at t ¼ 1 for the policyholder,
the market consistent price can vary with the backing assets. This phenomena
reflects the reality that two policyholders with identical contracts purchased with
different insurers can end up with a different payout in case the policyholder is
allowed to terminate the contract before maturity with a market value adjustment
clause. In such case, the potential loss incurred by the insurer due to the early sale of
the backing assets is borne by the policyholder.
Notice that the liability value, in absence of a default,
L1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 Pð1; 2Þ ¼ Pð0; 2Þ
Bð0; 2Þ B
ð1Þð1; 2Þ ð67Þ
can both be bigger, as well as smaller than its Solvency II value, Pð1; 2Þ. If the
illiquidity spread s1 has not increased significantly compared to s0, then L1 will be
bigger than Pð1; 2Þ. This would, in reality, allow insurers to give profit sharing to the
policyholder. If, on the other hand, the illiquidity spread s1 increased significantly,
though without a default, then we have L1\Pð1; 2Þ. For the special case s ¼ s0 ¼ s1
studied in [14], we find that ð1  pÞ1 [ 1 and e2s0s1  1. Indeed, in [14], this
excess return generates a positive consumption stream at time 1. Notice that in the
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proposed reduced consumption stream model there is never any upstreaming of
capital at time 1, even if L1 [ Pð1; 2Þ, instead we have eC1 ¼ 0, or eC1\0 in case of
a default.
The policyholder is not at risk since we impose in the model that
L2 ¼ Pð2; 2Þ ¼ 1. This is achieved via the consumption stream backing the
liability. However, in providing this backing, the shareholder does not run an
illiquidity spread risk. Indeed, both eC1 and eC2 are only negative in case a default is
realized in the respective time step. We also note that, contrary to time step 1, there
is upstreaming of capital at time 2 (eC2 [ 0), as long as no default occurred at t ¼ 2.
In reality, the illiquidity spread process est and the default process Ct are often
positively correlated. Indeed, as the spreads on certain government bonds increased
significantly during the recent European sovereign-debt crisis, it was the
shareholders, who are liable for the consumption stream, that grew increasingly
worried as insurers’ ratings decreased, forcing insurers to reorient their asset
portfolios. This would correspond in our model to replacing the bond A at time 1
with another bond A0 where A1 \ A01. This necessitates a cash injection A
0
1  A1 at
time 1 to maintain the liability backing (L01 ¼ A01). Just as in the case of default (see
equation (59)), we impose A01 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ. Indeed, by executing this transaction, the
insurer assumes the full spread risk. Shareholders would tend to prefer such known
cash injection over the possibly bigger and unknown consumption stream needed to
back the liability in case of a default at a later time.
On the other hand, when economic conditions are good, the opposite transaction
where A1 [ A01 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ could be executed. In this case, capital is released which
could be upstreamed, allocated as profit sharing or used to supply an additional
countercyclical reserve as suggested in [1]. Another regulatory approach could be
the restrict (full) consumption when A1 [ Pð1; 2Þ. This case corresponds to the
reduced consumption stream model with L1 [ Pð1; 2Þ as if a countercyclical reserve
is built into the liability valuation.
5 Downside risk and exotic options as protection
5.1 Probability of a negative consumption
Following [3], we will analyze the probability of a negative consumption. Let us
first consider the example from 2.2.2.
Prob½C1\0 ¼ Prob
h
ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1 C1  1\0
i
¼ p þ Prob
h












Cð1Þ2 \ð1  pÞ es1
i
¼ p : ð69Þ
Let us now do the same exercise for the reduced consumption stream:
Prob½eC1\0 ¼ Prob
h






ð1  pÞ2 e2s0 C2 þ ð1  pÞ1 es1 ð1  C1ÞCð1Þ2  1\0
i
¼ p : ð71Þ
The total probability to have a negative consumption in the original example is
bigger than 2p, while it is exactly equal to 2p with the reduced consumption stream.
Indeed, in the original example it might happen that at time 1 the spreads have risen
such that the asset value went down enough to necessitate a capital injection (C1\0
with C1 ¼ 1). However, at time 2 the bond did not default (C2 ¼ 1) so that the claim
can be paid out and the remaining asset value, including the capital injected at t ¼ 1,
is released via a positive consumption stream (C2 [ 0). In the reduced consumption
stream case, such scenario would not provoke a negative consumption at time 1.
5.2 An option as protection against the downside spread risk
Let us now consider an insurance company for which the shareholders are willing to
support the reduced consumption stream (see equations (63)–(65)), but where the
Solvency II condition A1 Pð1; 2Þ has to be respected, as in the example in Sect.
2.2.2. The reduced consumption stream at t ¼ 1 is non-zero if a default occurred. If
there is no default, the consumption stream is zero. However, if, in that case, the
illiquidity spread led to a bond value less than Pð1; 2Þ, an additional cash injection
will be needed to comply with the condition A1 Pð1; 2Þ.
The insurer could decide to buy an option which guarantees exactly this
additional cash flow, to protect against this specific downside risk. Another solution,
suggested in [1], is for the insurer to hold an additional reserve. This additional
reserve would be used to supply the additional cash flow. Both solutions come at a
cost, either the cost of buying the option, or the cost to remunerate the capital in the
additional reserve. The insurance premium increase necessary to cover the cost of
remunerating the additional buffer was estimated at 10 to 15% in [12] compared to
current premium levels.
In this section, we consider the option that would generate the additional cash
flow. The price of this option is exactly the price to comply with the Solvency II
condition A1 Pð1; 2Þ, while operating with a reduced consumption stream. In the
example in Sect. 2.2.2, we obtained the consumption stream C1 by requiring
A1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ. To safeguard A1 Pð1; 2Þ, we thus need a cash flow injection of
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ðC1Þþ ¼ maxðC1; 0Þ, since a cash injection equals a negative consumption
stream. The payoff from the option D1ð 0Þ necessary to preserve A1 Pð1; 2Þ is
then given by:
ðC1Þþ   eC1 þ D1 ; ð72Þ
or,










1  ð1  pÞ1 e2s0s1
iþ
C1Pð1; 2Þ : ð75Þ
We see that the payout is indeed zero if the bond has defaulted at t ¼ 1, since in that
case the reduced consumption stream eC1 is used as capital injection. Notice that no
additional option is needed at maturity (t ¼ 2) since the reduced consumption
stream already ensures that L2 ¼ Pð2; 2Þ ¼ 1.
For insurance contracts with a long-term character, an option at each time step
will be required to cover the downside risk associated with the illiquidity spread.
Extending the formalism to larger m, one can find the dependency of the option
price on m, using option pricing theory. Given Eq. (43), the price has an
exponential behavior in m, rendering these options expensive for long-term
insurance contracts.
6 Conclusions
In Sect. 2, we extended the model for defaultable bonds developed in [14] to include
longer maturities and a time-varying illiquidity spread process.
In Sect. 3, we applied the liability valuation rules of Solvency II to a long-term
insurance contract. We showed that it will induce a volatile required capital. The
volatility is composed of three contributions and their cross terms: a term linked
with the volatility of the term structure, another term originating from the default
process and a final term coming from the illiquidity spread. The illiquidity spread
term grows quickly with the maturity of the insurance product, making it the
dominant volatility source for long-term insurance products.
In Sect. 4, we introduced a liability valuation technique, the reduced consump-
tion stream model, which is applicable for illiquid insurance products. It does lead
to a liability valuation which becomes asset-dependent once the contract is
underwritten. This does not result in an arbitrage possibility since the product is
non-redeemable and non-tradable. We proved the market consistency of the model.
As detailed in the introduction, while our mathematical example exhibits the
stylized features of a perfect cash flow matching and an entirely stable liability cash
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flow runoff, in practice many annuity and pension products do have a high degree of
illiquidity. As such, we believe that this valuation technique has practical
applications for such products on the condition that they are cash flow matched.
We can now compare this proposed valuation model with the Matching
Adjustment valuation model. Both techniques take into account the illiquid nature
of the insurance liability and reduce the volatility of the required capital. If we
extend the reduced consumption stream model to larger maturities m, one can prove
that its capital volatility is lower than the Solvency II volatility computed in Sect. 3.
Indeed, the volatility in Sect. 3 is dominated by the spread, while the volatility of
the reduced consumption stream is dominated by the default process, due to its
intrinsic construction. As proven in [14], the Matching Adjustment valuation is not
market consistent, whereas our proposed methodology is market consistent.
Moreover, it does not change the (initial) price of the insurance product, nor does
it recognize upfront gains from the illiquidity spread.
In Sect. 5, we verified that the probability of needing a capital injection is higher
under the Solvency II valuation rules than in the reduced consumption model. The
additional capital injection at time 1 under the Solvency II valuation rules is due
when the illiquidity spread increases without having a realized default. An insurer
could either opt to constitute a reserve from which this additional cash injection
could be sourced, or it could opt to buy an option which would cover this risk. The
price of such option corresponds to the exact additional cost linked with the
Solvency II liability valuation method. We find that the price of this option increases
rapidly with the maturity of the insurance contract.
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